December 7
10-11:55
Met with President, Shultz, Don Regan, John McMahon, Mc F Farlane, John Poindexter – in a upstairs residence of WH (end of corridor sitting room) – re NSC Iran proposal — President wants to free hostages — thinks a Hawks and TOWs would only go to “Moderate Elements in Army” + would help overthrow Iranian gov’t. I argued strongly that we have an Embargo that Makes Arms Sales to Iran illegal + President couldn’t violate it + that “washing” transaction thru Israel wouldn’t’ make it legal — Shultz, Don Regan agreed. President sd. he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn’t answer charge that “big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages”. Preside President left to do his noon radio
Students will be able to describe the events of the Iran-Contra Affair.
Students will analyze the motivations of Reagan Administration officials during the Iran-Contra Affair.
Students will appraise U.S. foreign policy in the late Cold War period.
Throughout his presidency, Reagan pursued an aggressively anti-Communist foreign policy. Early in his first term, Reagan had authorized a covert CIA operation to overthrow leftist governments in Nicaragua. Radicals known as Sandinistas had overthrown Nicaragua's military dictatorship and were threatening to do the same in El Salvador. The Contras were a coalition of paramilitary groups that opposed the Sandinistas. Fearing the spread of communism in the Western hemisphere, Reagan dubbed the Contras “freedom fighters” and channeled weapons and C.I.A. support to them. Congress remained skeptical, though; in 1984, it passed the Boland Amendment banning U.S. military aid to the Contras. Administration officials did not give up their support of the Contras, however; they merely looked for new sources of funds, other than federal appropriations from Congress, to send to Nicaragua.
National security advisors hatched a plan to fund the Contras with money brought in by the sale of weapons to Iran. Officials also hoped the weapons sales would make Iran more favorable to helping the U.S. negotiate with Islamic radicals who had taken several Americans hostage in Lebanon. The proposed sale of weapons, however, was illegal; the U.S. had passed an embargo and publicly denounced Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. In order to hide U.S. actions, Reagan officials sold millions of dollars worth of weapons secretly through an intermediary.
The profits from this illegal arms trade, along with other money that was raised secretly from foreign governments, were then used to fund the Contras in their war against Nicaragua’s radical Sandinista government. Several NSC officials went to jail, and much evidence suggested that Reagan had condoned the illegal acts. At the very least, it is clear that he supported the sale of weapons to Iran for the release of hostages and he supported the covert aid to the Contras. No one ever testified that he approved the weapons sales in order to fund the Contras. Although Democratic lawmakers shied away from any effort to impeach the still-popular president, the Iran-Contra Affair nonetheless deprived Reagan of his ability to set the national political agenda for the remainder of his term.
Step 1: First review with students the basic tenet of the Monroe Doctrine: that the U.S. has the right to intervene in Latin America in order to protect its interests in the Western hemisphere. Ask students to think of other events in U.S. history where the Monroe Doctrine was invoked. Then review with students what the Iran-Contra Affair was. The teacher may wish to share the background information provided in the historical context section of this activity plan or to review a textbook's account of the events. Enforce the basic definition of the Iran-Contra Affair: The Reagan Administration secretly sold weapons to Iran in order to fund anti-Communist fighters in Nicaragua known as Contras.
Step 2: Hand out the timeline of the Iran-Contra Affair. Go over the events with students. Ask students to identify which aspects of the timeline reflect Cold War policies and which events indicate the new threat the U.S. faced from Islamic fundamentalists. Reinforce with students that the Iran-Contra Affair happened at a time when the threats to the United States were shifting from the Cold War to terrorism. Ask students to tell which threat in the 1980s seems more pressing, based on what they have learned about the Cold War to that point and what they know about U.S. foreign policy today. Tell students to keep the timeline as reference for the rest of the activity.
Step 3: Pass out the "Decoding U.S. Foreign Policy" worksheet and the document "Reagan Administration Officials Debate How to Support the Contras." Before reading the document, ask students to note when this document was created and what type of document it is. Ask students to "place" this document on their timeline of the Iran-Contra Affair.
Step 4: Ask for seven volunteers to read the "script" of the meeting. Before beginning, read the description. The different roles are:
Secretary/Narrator (Reads the time/place/persons present)
Robert McFarlane, National Security Advisor
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense
Edwin Meese, Attorney General
George H.W. Bush, Vice President
Ronald Reagan, President
Now model "decoding" the document with the worksheet. Together, fill out the worksheet, making sure that students know how to answer each part of the worksheet. Before moving on, make sure that students know how this event fits on the timeline and what it tells us about the motivations and thinking of Reagan Administration officials at the beginning of the Iran-Contra Affair.
Step 5: Divide students into groups of four. The teacher can divide students into groups according to skill level or create mixed-skill level groups. Below are suggested "reading levels" for each document. In their groups, students should read one of the four documents and decode it using a second copy of the worksheet.
Beginning: The CIA Advises Nicaraguans How to Sabotage the Sandinista Government
Mid-Level 1: "Big Strong President Reagan" Encourages Sale of Weapons to Iran
Mid-Level 2: The Deputy Director of the CIA Advises on the Situation in Nicaragua
Advanced: Nicaragua's President Challenges U.S. Intervention in His Country
If working in mixed-skill level groups, students should share out their documents with each other before the next step.
Step 6: Ask students to share their findings from their documents with the whole class, focusing on their responses in Section III of the worksheet. Project the documents as the students discuss them and place them on the timeline. Possible discussion questions include:
Were the actions of Reagan's administration in the Iran-Contra Affair justifiable? Why or why not?
Had Reagan or his administration officials committed illegal acts and should they have been held accountable? Why or why not?
What do these documents tell us about U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War?
Do these events challenge the assumptions of the Monroe Doctrine? Is the Monroe Doctrine a sound foreign policy?
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING
June 25, 1984: 2:00--3:00 P.M.: Situation Room
SUBJECT: Central America
PARTICIPANTS [abridged]:
The President
The Vice President
Secretary [of State] George P. Shultz
Secretary [of Defense] Caspar W. Weinberger
C.I.A. [Director] William J. Casey
Ambassador [to the United Nations] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey, Jr.
[Attorney General] Edwin Meese, III
[National Security Advisor] Robert C. McFarlane
Minutes
Mr. McFarlane: The purpose of this meeting is to focus on the political, economic, and military situation in Central America...
There seems to be no prospect that the Democratic leadership will provide for any vote on the Nicaraguan program...
Secretary Shultz: ...I would like to get money for the Contras, but another lawyer...said that if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense.
...[The lawyer's] argument is that the US government may raise and spend funds only through an appropriation by the Congress.
Secretary Weinberger: ...[The lawyer] should realize that the United States would not be spending the money for the anti-Sandinista program; it is merely helping the anti-Sandinistas obtain the money from other sources. Therefore, the United States is not, as a government, spending money obtained from other sources.
Mr. Meese: ...I want to emphasize that it's important to tell the Department of Justice that we want them to find the proper and legal basis which will permit the United States to assist in obtaining third party resources for the anti-Sandinistas...
Vice President Bush: How can anyone object to the US encouraging third parties to provide help to the anti-Sandinistas under the finding? The only problem that might come up is if the United States were to promise to give these third parties something in return so that some people could interpret this as some kind of exchange.
...
Mr. McFarlane: I propose that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas until we have the information we need, and I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way.
President Reagan: If such a story gets out, we'll all be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White House until we find out who did it.
WHY THE U.S. MUST END ITS WAR
By Daniel Ortega Saavedra;
Daniel Ortega Saavedra is President of Nicaragua.
President Reagan asks the American people and Congress to continue financing the Central Intelligence Agency's covert war against Nicaragua. He says his aim is to make Nicaragua cry ''uncle,'' to bring about a ''restructuring'' of our Government. Here are four reasons why the American people and their representatives should say no, and should demand an end to efforts to overthrow Nicaragua's popularly elected Government.
1. The covert war is illegal. The World Court, on May 10, 1984, ordered the United States immediately to stop its aggression. It cited the charters of the United Nations and Organization of American States, which prohibit the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of another nation. Instead of complying, the Administration walked out of the court.
The war cannot be justified as ''self-defense.'' The Administration now admits that its purpose is to overthrow our Government - not, as Congress and the American people were told, to interdict an alleged flow of arms to Salvadoran rebels. Even while it maintained this pretense, the Administration never produced real evidence of an arms flow - because it does not exist. . . Why care about international law? Because disrespect for law breeds chaos. When a powerful nation repudiates international law - and its highest symbol, the World Court - it threatens the entire legal order and sets a dangerous precedent.
2. The covert war is immoral. This war is directed against Nicaraguan civilians, not our military. The ''contras'' penetrate our territory from bases in Honduras and Costa Rica to murder, torture, mutilate, kidnap and abuse defenseless women, men and children. They burn down and blow up farms, health centers, food depots and schools. Thousands of civilians have perished and the damage to our economy is in the hundreds of millions of dollars. . . .
It is immoral, and contrary to American values, for the Administration to attempt to impose a new government on Nicaragua. Our Government was elected Nov. 4, 1984, in the freest, fairest elections in Nicaragua's history. More than 1.1 million people voted (75.4 percent of those registered) and seven political parties participated. The opposition parties received more than 33 percent of the vote and now hold 35 of 96 seats in our legislature. . . .
3. The covert war is futile and unnecessary. In more than four years of fighting, and despite more than $100 million in American aid, the contras have failed to capture or hold any Nicaraguan territory. There is only one explanation: they have no popular support….There is no reason for Washington to continue this support. Nicaragua represents no threat to any of its legitimate security interests in Central America….
4. The covert war is counter-productive. If President Reagan really wants us to reduce the size of our army, stop acquiring arms and send home foreign military advisers, he should end his covert war and his unprecedented military buildup in Honduras. If there were no war against us, we would enthusiastically divert manpower and resources, now consumed by defense requirements, to economic and social development.
The Administration complains that we obtain arms from socialist countries, but the Administration makes this necessary. Are we not entitled to obtain arms to defend ourselves? Washington has pressed its allies not to sell arms to us. Where else are we supposed to obtain them?
President Reagan calls us ''totalitarian'' because we imposed a state of emergency that restricts certain rights, including press freedom with regard to military and security matters. The state of emergency was imposed in 1982 in direct response to the covert war. If Mr. Reagan really wants the full restoration of political and civil rights, he need only stop the war. My Government is committed to lifting the state of emergency and restoring full press freedom and other rights as soon as that occurs.
As for trying to make us cry ''uncle,'' this only stiffens our resistance. We know only one cry - the cry for peace with dignity. That is what we seek from the United States. Despite the crimes committed against us, we extend our hand in friendship.
14 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Nicaragua
1. It is time to talk absolutely straight about Nicaragua. To recap where we are:
Based on all the assessments we have done, the Contras, even with American support, cannot overthrow the Sandinista regime...
The Nicaraguan regime is steadily moving toward consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist government and the establishment of a permanent and well armed ally of the Soviet Union and Cuba on the mainland of the Western Hemisphere. Its avowed aim is to spread further revolution in the Americas...
3. What is happening in Central America in many ways vividly calls to mind the old saw that those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it.
In 1958-60 we thought that we could reach some sort of an accommodation with Castro that would encourage him to build a pluralistic government in Cuba. We have been trying to do the same thing in Nicaragua, with the same success...
In Vietnam, our strategy consisted of a series of measures applied very gradually and over a long period of time. With each step of new US involvement the gradual approach enabled the enemy to adjust to each new turn of the screw so that by the end of the war, even in the face of the most severe bombing, the Vietnamese had developed enormous tolerance. Half measures, half-heartedly applied, will have the same result in Nicaragua.
...[Gates recommends that the best policy would be "overtly trying to bring down the regime through the following measures]:
Withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the regime in Managua and the recognition of a government in exile.
Overt provision to the government in exile of military assistance, funds, propaganda support and so forth including major efforts to gain additional support in international community, including real pressure.
Economic sanctions against Nicaragua, perhaps even including a quarantine...
Politically most difficult of all, the use of air strikes to destroy a considerable portion of Nicaragua's military buildup... This would be accompanied by an announcement that the United States did not intend to invade Nicaragua but that no more arms deliveries...would be permitted...
8. These are hard measures. They probably are politically unacceptable. But it is time to stop fooling ourselves about what is going to happen in Central America...
9. The fact is that the Western Hemisphere is the sphere of influence of the United States. If we have decided totally to abandon the Monroe Doctrine, if in the 1980s taking strong actions to protect our interests despite the hail of criticism is too difficult, then we ought to save political capital in Washington, acknowledge our helplessness and stop wasting everybody's time.
...
11. All this may be politically out of the question. Probably. But all the cards ought to be on the table and people should understand the consequences of what we do and do not do in Nicaragua. Half measures will not even produce half successes. The course we have been on (even before the funding cut-off) -- as the last two years suggest -- will result in further strengthening of the regime and a Communist Nicaragua which, allied with its Soviet and Cuban friends, will serve as the engine for the destabilization of Central America...